Introduction
Conventional wisdom states that large banks are safer than small banks because they can diversify more. This conventional wisdom, however, confuses risk with probability of failure. While the law of large numbers does imply that a large bank is less likely to fail than a small bank, equating this tendency to less risk falls into what Samuelson termed the fallacyof large numbers. A $10 billion bank may be less likely to fail than a $10 million bank, but it may also saddle the investor with a $10 billion loss.
In this paper, I hope to clarify what this distinction means for banks. Banks diversify by growing--by adding risks--something distinctly different from the subdivision of risk behind standard portfolio theory. A simple mean-variance example will make the point that a bank's owner need not value diversification. After that, I take a regulator's perspective and consider how a bank guarantee fund, such as the FDIC, views bank growth and diversification. After a short review of why diversification by adding risks decreases the probability of bank failure, I look at how such diversification alters the expected value of FDIC payments, and then diversification's impact on the FDIC's expected utility, using recent results from the theory of standard risk aversion.
To concentrate on the cleanest example, this paper stays with the case of independent and identically distributed risks. This admittedly ignores the alleged ability of large banks to diversify regionally' or the possibly adverse incentives of deposit insurance (Boyd and Runkle [I 9931, Todd and Thomson [ I 99 I] ).
' Compare Haubrich (1990) with Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993) . Even small banks may diversify, however, by selling loans or participating in mortgage pools or other forms of securitization.
I. A Simple Example
Probably the easiest way to understand the effects of diversification by adding risks is to consider a bank financed exclusively by an owner/investor who cares only about means and variances. With no debt, failure disappears as an issue, and instead the question becomes the utility-maximizing portfolio for the bank's owner.
The owner and sole equity holder has, conveniently for us, sunk his entire wealth W into the bank. He faces the problem of dividing his portfolio between holding Ssafe government bonds with a certain r e l r n of zero and investing in some number Kof risky, independent bank loans with r e l r n s ri normally distributed as N(jI,S). If each loan costs a dollar, the investor's budget constraint is W S + K These bank loans are indivisible--the bank cannot diversify by spreading one dollar across many loans. Then the r e l r n on the portfolio is K Since ri is distributed N (@, &?S) , standard techniques (Fama and Miller [ 19721, i=l chapter 6, section 111) imply that In mean-standard deviation space, equation (I) defines a portfolio opportunity set illustrated by figure I (for W 5 ) . The opportunity set is disjointed, since the decision to add another loan is discrete. Depending on the shape of the indifference curves, the bank owner may put none, all, or some of his wealth into bank loans. Figure I shows a typical case with an interior solution. This illustrates quite clearly that the bank does not always wish to diversify. Stated another way, the portfolio
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return is distributed N(-p,-(T) , so that as the bank invests in more loans, the W W standard deviation as well as the expected return increases. Which one matters more depends on preferences.
An all-equity bank offers a nice illustration, but does not provide a very representative case. Even a stylized bank should have deposits.
Does the FDIC Want Banks to Diversify?
Allowing banks to take in deposits means allowing banks to fail. The return on assets may not cover the payments promised to the depositors. In the U.S., this liability devolves upon the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This provides a natural focal point for our discussion. Actual banks raise money in many different ways, using several types of preferred stock, subordinated bonds, and commercial paper. What happens in bankruptcy is at best complicated and at worst unknown, as the courts must determine the validity of claims as diverse as offsetting deposits and the sourceof-strength doctrine. A detailed consideration of how each class of investors views diversification, then, is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, to make what is admittedly a simple point, I concentrate on the FDIC, which ultimately bears the liability for bank failures.
The FDIC steps in if the realization of bank assets Y is too low to repay the face value of the debt I; that is, if Y<E This is a fairly general formulation in that the assets producing Ymay be funded by means other than deposits, but it is not completely general because it ignores the possibility that the FDIC may have priority over some clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm investors. For the rest of the paper, however, I will restrict myself to purely depositfinanced banks.
What is the face value of the debt, F? With no capital, if the bank funds n projects each requiring funds 4 the face value is the sum of the deposits, F= n f . The payout of bank assets is likewise the sum over the different projects, where n indexes the number of projects in which the bank has invested.
A. f i e Probability of Bank Failure
How likely is it that this bank will fail? The answer is Pr(Yn < n . f) or
Assume the x,'s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean E(xi)=p and further assume that Rp, SO that the face value of the debt is smaller than the expected payout of the assets.
We can rewrite expression (2) as Y because the set {y:y < n . f) is the same as the set {y:-< f) . ( 1 984) explicitly states, the weak law of large numbers implies that diversification by adding risks reduces the probability of bank failure.
B. fie Expected Value of the fWIC-5 Liabilities
As Samuelson points out, a rational utility maximizer maximizes expected utility, not the probability of success. The probability of each outcome must be weighted by the utility of that outcome. As mentioned before, a $10 billion bank that does fail may cost the FDIC more to resolve than a $10 million bank.
In the simplest case of risk neutrality, expected utility corresponds to expected value. The first question, then, equivalent to assuming risk neutrality on the part of the agency, concerns the expected value of the FDIC's payout. Though the calculation is not particularly difficult, I have not seen it before in the literature. The expected payout value becomes a question of finding the expected value of a particular function.
The FDIC must pay It is worth noting that the expected value of (4) is not a conditional expectation.
If the set A = { Yn : Y,< F), then the expected value of (4) is P(A) E( YnI A) rather than
E ( K ( A).
A simple example will make this clear. Take a four-point distribution, A slightly stronger condition proposed by Kimball (1993) has a simple characterization. Kimba117s standard risk aversion implies proper risk aversion. It thus applies a slightly stronger condition than is strictly necessary for the fallacy. If a utility function displays standard risk aversion, then an investor disliking a bet will also dislike a collection of such bets. Kimball (1993) shows that necessary and sufficient conditions for standard risk aversion are (monotone) DARA and (monotone) decreasing absolute prudence. If the utility function in question has a fourth derivative, then these conditions become A key point here is that the individual finds each independent risk undesirable.
(Kimball has a slightly weaker, more technical condition that he calls loss aggravation.)
This certainly applies to the problem as we have defined it, because the payoff to the FDIC is nonpositive--at best it pays nothing. This is not the only way to structure the problem, however, because the FDIC collects deposit insurance premiums from banks. In the first case, where the FDIC dislikes insuring an individual loan, expressions (6) and (7) provide sufficient conditions for the agency to dislike insuring any portfolio of such loans. That is, diversification by adding risks does not work;
adding risks makes'the insurance agency (guarantee corporation) worse off.
In the second case, where the FDIC likes insuring an individual loan, equations (6) and (7) clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Now v(xd defined in equation (8) can be treated as a utility function, so Diamond's question comes down to whether u(.) is more risk averse than 4.). If it is, then the risk premium for bearing the second risk is lower than for the first, and the fallacy of large numbers is not a fallacy.
Diamond derives two sufficient conditions for u(.) to be more risk averse than 4.). Using Jensen's inequality, he shows that
are sufficient conditions when the risk has zero expected value. When the risk is freely chosen, he must append decreasing absolute risk aversion, equation (6). The reason for this is that a freely chosen gamble increases mean wealth, which requires us to augment the sufficient conditions.
Notice that inequalities (7) and (TO) cannot both hold: (7) demands a negative fourth derivative, and (10) demands a positive fourth derivative. The inequalities apply in different situations, however. Inequality (7) concerns unfavorable bets and describes when bearing one such risk makes the agent less willing to bear another.
Inequality (1 0) concerns favorable bets and describes when bearing such a risk makes the agent even more willing to bear another. The conditions really answer two quite different questions. Since each inequality provides a sufficient but not necessary condition, any contradiction between the answers is more apparent than real.
An important caveat is that this analysis is consciously partial equilibrium, concentrating on the risk of a single bank. If the bank grows by absorbing smaller banks, the total number of loans insured by the system does not change. In a bank with many loans, the profitable loans may offset unprofitable loans and lessen the guarantor's liability. Since the FDIC does not share in the positive profits, it cannot undertake a similar offset if the loans are in different banks. This is not the only scenario, however. Recall from equation (4) that for one loan, the FDIC pays nothing if the loan's payoff exceeds its face value, and otherwise pays the difference. Denoting this function by g(x) (as in section II), the risk premium is defined as the n l that satisfies
With xfollowing the simplest exponential distribution, e-" , the expected value in (I 1) becomes
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Using exponential utility of the form e-aW allows us to solve for a , :
For two loans,g(x) is zero if xexceeds 2 f and 2f-xotherwise. The random variable x, as the sum of two independent exponentials, has a gamma distribution, Then the expected value becomes Eg(2) = (f -1) + (f + l)e-2r. Solving for the risk premium implicitly defined by u(W, + E(g(2)) + n ,) = Eu(W, + g (2)) yields
To complete the example, set 4 the face value of the debt, to I, and risk aversion to 1 and 2, and evaluate (12) This example illustrates two points. First, diversification can work. For low risk aversion, the required risk premium for two loans is lower than for only one.
Conversely, for higher risk aversion, adding risks does not help: The risk premium for two risks exceeds twice the risk premium for one risk. Both points emphasize the sufficiency of expressions (6), (7), (9), and (I 0) , because the example satisfies neither set and still illustrates both gains and losses from diversification. Just because a bank is less likely to fail does not mean the bank is less risky. If the insurer, or owner, is risk neutral, a more complicated argument shows that the bank is less risky in the sense of expected value. With risk aversion, however, the question become ambiguous. As a practical matter, sufficient conditions exist, and the combination of exponential utility with exponential distributions provides a tractable framework for further exploration.
